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DOLPHIN CONSERVATION IN THE TUNA
INDUSTRY: THE UNITED STATES' ROLE
IN AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
Thousands of dolphin die annually in the international tuna
fishery. This Comment explores the history of that problem and
the domestic and international attempts to alleviate it. Foreign
legislation, positions of international organizations, and docu-
ments of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference are re-
viewed as potential sources of an international solution. The
Comment emphasizes the need for active United States involve-
ment in international programs, comprehensive data on the
dolphin populations, and immediate action to avoid excessive
exploitation. It concludes with a suggestion that increased pub-
lic concern for dolphin may be utilized effectively to support con-
servation initiatives.
The hunting of Dolphins is immoral and that man can no more draw nigh
the gods as a welcome sacrificer nor touch their altars with clean hands
but pollutes those who share the same roof with him, whoso willingly de-
vises destruction for Dolphins. For equally with human slaughter the
gods abhor the deathly doom of the monarchs of the deep ....
INTRODUCTION
Dolphin2 have been exploited throughout recorded history in
1. OPPLAN, Halieutica, in OpPLAN, COLL=HUS, TYPmoDORus 201, 493 (1928).
2. The terms "dolphin" and "porpoise" are often confused and used inter-
changeably. Reiger, Dolphin Sacred, Porpoise Profane, AUDUBON, Jan., 1975, at 3.
Some authors consider the porpoise family, Phocoenidae, to be a subfamily of the
dolphin family, Delphinidae. Scarff, The International Management of Whales,
Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment (pt. 2), 6 ECOLOGY L.Q.
571, 611 n.749 (1977). In common usage the term "porpoise" is often used to refer
to dolphin as well as to the true porpoise of the Phocoenidae family. This Corn-
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virtually every sea on earth.3 In some areas dolphin are fished in-
tentionally as a source of food, animal food, oil, fertilizer, and
leather.4 They are also captured alive for display, research, and
military uses.5 Fishermen catch them incidentally and inadver-
tently in other operations throughout the world.6 Thousands are
now taken incidentally after intentional capture in conjunction
with tuna purse-seining operations.
7
In the late 1950's, fishermen observed that yellowfin tuna school
with certain species of dolphin in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
(ETP).8 In approximately 1960 commercial fishermen began set-
ting their purse-seines around these schools. Although the
fishermen attempted to free the dolphin, thousands became en-
tangled in the nets and suffocated or drowned.9 Between 1960 and
ment will follow the taxonomical distinction that porpoise are beakless mammals,
generally small in size with a triangular dorsal fin. Reiger, supra. Virtually all the
literature concerning the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) tuna fishery refers to the
"tuna-porpoise" problem while in reality the animals involved are dolphin. "Set-
ting on porpoise" is a common phrase for the fishing procedure, but the reader
should remember that dolphin are being discussed.
3. For a detailed historical account of dolphin exploitation by geographical
region, see Report of the Meeting on Smaller Cetaceans, 32 J. FISHERIES RESEARCH
BOARD CAN. 883, 946-52 (1975) (discusses the 1974 deliberations of the Subcommit-
tee on Small Cetaceans, Scientific Committee, International Whaling Commis-
sion) [hereinafter cited as Smaller Cetaceans].
4. Id. at 955-56.
5. Id. at 956. The United States Navy has a dolphin program called Sea
Search. The program entails housing bottlenose dolphin in floating pens to guard
United States submarine bases in the Philippines. The Navy used dolphin in the
recovery of a nuclear weapon accidentally dropped into shallow water off Puerto
Rico. Six dolphin were used in Vietnam literally to blow up enemy frogmen by
ramming them with hypodermic needles attached to high-pressure gas cylinders
mounted on their rostrums. Chapple, Day of the Dolphins-In Court, NEw W.,
Mar. 27, 1978, at 33, 34.
6. Smaller Cetaceans, supra note 3, at 956. Such inadvertent takings occur in
gillnet, trawl, purse-seine, set-net, and longline fisheries. Gillnets cause the grav-
est problem because they are composed of monofilament webbing that is probably
acoustically invisible to cetaceans. Cetaceans are members of the order Cetacea
and are completely acquatic mostly marine mammals of the subclass Eutheria;
they include whales, dolphin, and porpoise. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLrSH LAxGUAGE (unabr. 2d ed. 1957). See also note 2 supra.
Research is needed to develop gillnet webbing that will be more easily avoided by
cetaceans and yet will be efficient in catching fish. Smaller Cetaceans, supra.
7. Smaller Cetaceans, supra note 3, at 957. Fishermen using the purse-seine
procedure deploy speedboats to herd groups of dolphin into large purse-seine
nets. Both tuna traveling with dolphin and dolphin are trapped when the huge net
is "pursed" beneath them, like a drawstring purse. Committee for Humane Legis.,
Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D.D.C.), affrd and modified, 540 F.2d 1141
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
8. Minasian, Dolphins and/or Tuna: An Update on the Problems of Purse
Seining for Yellowfin, OcEANs, Nov., 1977, at 60, 61-62. Yellowfin tuna, canned as
"light tuna," are the only tuna that associate to any degree with dolphin. Skipjack,
Albacore, Bluefin, Bigeye, and Bonita tuna do not school with dolphin. Id.
9. Committee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 300
(D.D.C.), aff'd and modified, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Many dolphin would
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1972 a total of three to five million dolphin were lost.o Although
in 1971 the United States performed ninety-eight percent of the
tuna fishery on dolphin, more States are constantly becoming in-
volved in this highly efficient method of harvesting yellowfin.11
The problem is also expanding geographically as dolphin are
found to associate with yellowfin tuna in other parts of the
world.'2 In 1976 there were already unconfirmed reports that Eu-
ropean and African fishermen were killing dolphin in the Atlantic
at rates estimated to be as high as a quarter of a million per
year.1 3 This Comment discusses the actions taken within both
dive to the bottom of the net where their snouts and fins would become snagged in
the webbing. Unable to surface, the air-breathing dolphin would suffocate. Others
would drown as a result of physical injury, shock, or the refusal to abandon
trapped dolphin. Id. Such entanglement occurs partially because the dolphin pri-
marily involved in the ETP fishery are of the open-ocean Stenella species and are
high-strung, active, and nervous. When frightened, their only response is forward
flight. These dolphin cannot maneuver in tight quarters and must use their entire
bodies to turn. Once its rostrum is caught in the net, backing up is physically diffi-
cult and psychologically impossible for the Stenella dolphin-it can continue only
to attempt to swim forward. Pryor & Norris, The Tuna/Porpoise Problem: Behav-
ioral Aspects, OcEm-us, Spring, 1978, at 31, 34-35.
10. Minasian, supra note 8, at 60. The estimated kill of the United States fleet
for 1971 reached 312,400. Committee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 540
F.2d 1141, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
11. Annual Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission for 1977,
at 17 (1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review). Eighty percent of the in-
ternational fleet, in terms of seiner capacity, take part in the fishery for dolphin-
associated tuna. National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, Dep't of Commerce, FEIS [Final Environmental Impact
Statement], Promulgation of Regulations and Proposed Issuance of Permits to
Commercial Fishermen Allowing the Taking of Marine Mammals in the Course of
Yellowfin Tuna Purse Seining Operations from 1978 through 1980, at 25 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as FEIS]. During 1977 vessels from Bermuda, Canada, Colom-
bia, the Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Senegal, Spain, the United States, and Vene-
zuela were involved in the ETP tuna fishery. Annual Report of the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Association for 1977, supra. Current reports include France, the
Netherlands, South Korea, and Taiwan in the dolphin-associated tuna fishery in
the eastern Pacific. Interview with Witold L. Klawe, IATTC researcher (Jan. 30,
1979).
12. Smaller Cetaceans, supra note 3, at 947, 951. Areas of probable expansion
include the Eastern Tropical Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Indian Ocean. Id.
13. Porpoise Slaughter, AunUnoN, Sept., 1976, at 122. Fishermen occasionally
catch Dusky, common, and Heaviside's dolphin accidentally at night in a purse-
seine fishery off the west coast of Africa. This take amounts only to about 100 ani-
mals per year. No figures exist on the intentional yet incidental taking of dolphin
by the tuna purse-seiners in that area. Ad Hoe Group 1 - Small Cetaceans and
Sirenians, Advisory Committee on Marine Resources Research, Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations, Mammals in the Seas, U.N. Doc.
the United States and the international community to alleviate
this formidable threat to the dolphin populations.
THE UNITED STATES' POSITION
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972
In 1972 the United States Congress passed the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA).14 The protection of the dolphin, as mem-
bers of the biological order Cetacea,'5 falls within the scope of
this Act' 6 and was a major impetus in its enactment.' 7 The pri-
mary objective of the legislation is to protect marine mammals as
significant elements within their ecosystems.' 8 The realization of
that goal necessitates the maintenance of the optimum sustain-
able population (OSP)19 of each species or population stock2O of
marine mammal.21 The Act also calls for immediate action to re-
plenish any species or population stock that has fallen below its
OSp.22
In formulating the Act, Congress specified its recognition that
marine mammals have esthetic and recreational values as well as
value as an economic resource.23 Such values are of international
significance,24 and the Act mandates initiation by the United
States of international agreements for marine mammal research
and conservation.25 Research was a particularly essential ele-
ment of the Act initially because current knowledge of marine
mammal ecology and population dynamics was inadequate to di-
rect any effective management program.26
FAO/ACMRR/MM/SE/3, at 12-13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mammals in the
Seas].
14. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976)).
15. See note 6 supra.
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1976).
17. Minasian, supra note 8, at 60.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (1976).
19. The MMPA originally defined the OSP of any population stock as "the
number of animals which will result in the maximum productivity of the popula-
tion .... keeping in mind the optimum carrying capacity of the habitat and the
health of the ecosystem of which they form a constituent element." Id. § 1362(9).
"The term 'optimum carrying capacity' means the ability of a given habitat to sup-
port the optimum sustainable population of a species or population stock in a
healthy state without diminishing the ability of the habitat to continue that func-
tion." Id. § 1362(8). For the current definition of OSP, see note 88 infra.
20. A population stock is a group of marine mammals of the same species or of
smaller taxa in a common geographical distribution that interbreed when mature.
16 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1976).
21. Id. § 1361(2).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 1361(6).
24 Id.
25. Id. § 1378(a).
26. Id. § 1361(3). The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is the fed-
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The MMPA imposes a complete moratorium2 7 on the taking28
and importation of marine mammals and marine mammal prod-
ucts.29 However, exceptions to the moratorium allow takings for
scientific research, for public display, or for other purposes con-
sistent with the Act.30 The Act also allowed the commercial fish-
ing industry a two-year grace period beginning October 21, 1972, to
reduce its incidental dolphin kill to an insignificant level.3 1
The MMPA applies to all takings within waters under the juris-
diction of the United States32 except as expressly provided by an
international treaty, convention, or agreement to which the
United States was a party before the effective date of the
MMPA.a3 The prohibitions further apply to takings on the high
seas by persons or vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States3 4 but do not apply to takings within the territorial
eral agency in charge of research. The United States government also supports re-
search related to the tuna-dolphin problem through the National Science
Foundation-Research Applied to National Needs (NSF/RANN) and the Marine
Mammal Commission (MMC). These organizations make funding for research
contracts available, but funds are limited. The Porpoise Rescue Foundation (PRF)
has been established with funding from United States tuna producers and proces-
sors. The objective of this organization is to foster, promote, and fund the develop-
ment of dolphin-saving techniques, not only through modification of equipment
and fishing strategies, but also through study of dolphin and tuna themselves.
Funding is also a problem for the PRF. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion, The Tuna-Porpoise Relationship: Research, Management, and Possible
IA'ITC Role 43 (1977) (background paper) [hereinafter cited as IATTC Back-
ground Paper].
27. Moratorium means complete cessation of the taking of marine mam-
mals and a complete ban on their importation into the United States. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7) (1976).
28. "The term 'take' means to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to har-
ass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal." Id. § 1362(13).
29. Id. § 1371(a).
30. Id. § 1371(a) (1)-(3). Permits are required for all such takings. The Act au-
thorizes no permits for the taking of depleted species except for scientific re-
search. Id. § 1371(a) (3) (B).
31. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
32. (15) The term "waters under the jurisdiction of the United States"
means-
(A) the territorial sea of the United States, and
(B) the waters included within a zone, contiguous to the territorial sea
of the United States, of which the inner boundary is a line coterminous
with the seaward boundary of each coastal State, and the outer boundary
is a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles
from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.
Id. § 1362(15).
33. Id. § 1372(a) (2).
34. Id. § 1372(a)(1).
waters of another State.35
The greatest incidence of taking of marine mammals involves
the dolphin taken in the ETP yellowfin purse-seine fishery.36 This
problem has continued to be one of the most significant encoun-
tered by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the ad-
ministration of the MMVPA. 37
Regulating the Domestic Kill
In December, 1972, interim regulations were adopted to imple-
ment the MMPA.38 These regulations allowed the taking without
permits of marine mammals incidental to commercial fishing op-
erations during the two-year grace period.39 An incidental catch
was originally broadly defined.40 This definition was subse-
quently limited, however, to prevent a growing practice of tagging
dolphin with radio transmitters, releasing them, and tracking
them to find dolphin and tuna schools. Since April 2, 1973, no tak-
ing is incidental if the marine mammal is subsequently used to
assist in fishing operations.41
Research soon revealed that equipment modifications and
specialized fishing techniques could drastically reduce the
dolphin mortality rate.42 Two important developments were the
use of a backdown procedure and of a fine mesh safety panel in
the net. Backdown procedures begin with a series of maneuvers
used after the seine is tied down and pursed to hold the net open
to the greatest degree possible. The vessel then backs up, causing
the far end of the net to dip into the water to allow the dolphin to
escape.4 3 Fishermen discovered that the use of a panel of fine
mesh netting minimizes dolphin entanglement during this proce-
35. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1003 (5th Cir. 1977). The Mitchell
court recognized that the legislative authority of the United States extends to the
acts of its citizens even within the territory of other sovereigns but held that the
intent of the MMPA did not imply extraterritorial application. Id. at 1001 & n.10.
36. 39 Fed. Reg. 9685, 9685 (1974).
37. 41 Fed. Reg. 30,152, 30,153 (1976).
38. 37 Fed. Reg. 28,173, 28,177 (1972) (current version at 50 C.F.R. §§ 216.1-
.108 (1977)).
39. Id. at 28,177, 28,181 (50 C.F.R. § 216.10, see note 38 supra, was effective De-
cember 21, 1972-October 21, 1974).
40. "Incidental catch shall mean the taking of a marine mammal (1) because it
is directly interfering with commercial fishing operations or (2) as a consequence
of the steps used to secure the fish in connection with commercial fishing opera-
tions." Id. at 28,178 (current version at 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1977)).
41. 38 Fed. Reg. 7987 (1973). The current definition of "incidental catch" is at
50 C.F.,. § 216.3 (1977).
42. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,180, 31,180 (1973).
43. Id. at 31,181. For a full discussion of the procedure, see National Marine
Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Dep't of
Commerce, Progress of Research on Porpoise Mortality Incidental to Tuna Purse-
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dure.44 Through the combined use of the safety panel and the
backdown procedure an estimated ninety-eight percent of all net-
ted dolphin were released.45
Amended interim regulations, effective March 1, 1974, required
the installation of a safety panel in all tuna purse-seine nets, the
tightening of hand-hold openings to resist the insertion of a cylin-
drical object two inches in diameter, and the use of backdown and
other release procedures until all live dolphin were released.
46
The effective date of these regulations was subsequently post-
poned until April 1, 1974, to allow persons affected to obtain and
instal the fine mesh safety panels. 47 On March 13, 1974, a petro-
leum shortage, which resulted in limited supplies of nylon net-
ting, led to the effective date being further postponed until June 1,
1974.48 The nylon netting shortage continued, and on June 10,
1974, a provision was passed permitting the Regional Director of
the NMFS to waive the safety panel requirement if the order for
the netting was still in force and if he was convinced that the
panel would be inserted as soon as possible after its delivery.49
This final indefinite postponement appears to stand in direct con-
tradiction to section 1381(b) of the MIVIPA, which provides for a
maximum of four months to allow affected persons to implement
the regulations.5 0
Despite the petroleum shortage and the inconsistencies in-
Seine Fishing for Fiscal Year 1975, at 54 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Progress of
Research 1975].
44. Progress of Research 1975, supra note 43, at 58-59. Two statistical studies
revealed that one such panel reduces mortality in trouble-free sets by 35% or
more. This "Medina Panel" was developed by Captain Harold Medina, who, in
1971, replaced the 4 1/2" mesh in the backdown area of his net with a 720' long, 36'
deep strip of 2" mesh webbing to reduce the chances of dolphin becoming entan-
gled in the mesh during the backdown procedure. Id.
45. Committee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 nA
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Progress of Research 1975, supra note 43, at 51.
46. 39 Fed. Reg. 2481 (1974); 38 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (1973) (current version at 50
C.F.R. § 216.24(d) (2) (iv) (1977)).
47. 39 Fed. Reg. 2481 (1974).
48. Id. at 9684. To fish without a safety panel under this postponement, the
owner or master of a vessel was required to show that a netting order was placed
prior to April 1, 1974, that the order could not be filled by April 1, 1974, and that at
least the hand-hold openings had been secured as prescribed in 50 C.F.R.
§ 216.24(b) (4). Id.
49. Id. at 20,406, 20,407.
50. In establishing regulations for the 24-month grace period "the Secretary
... shall provide a reasonable time not exceeding four months for the persons af-
fected to implement such regulations.' 16 U.S.C. § 1381(b) (1976).
volved in the application of the interim regulations, the dolphin
mortality rates of the domestic fleet decreased substantially from
1973 to 1974. The figures failed to approach an insignificant
number, however, and stabilized at approximately 100,000 deaths
per year.5 1
The NMFS promulgated regulations that provided for the issu-
ance of permits for the taking of marine mammals incidental to
commercial fishing operations for one year after the expiration of
the two-year grace period on October 21, 1974.52 Before these reg-
ulations became effective, the NMFS published in the Federal
Register a notice of intent to prescribe such regulations, of the es-
timated existing levels of the species and population stocks of the
marine mammals concerned, and of the expected impact of the
proposed regulations on the OSP of each species or population
stocl 5 3 The NMFS made the required publication on March 13,
1974. It specified six dolphin species, listed the estimated popula-
tion level of each, and noted the importance of the incidental take
on the OSP's as unknown. 54 Despite this lack of information, the
final regulations became effective September 30, 1974,55 and the
American Tunaboat Association (ATA) was issued a general per-
mit allowing an unlimited number of dolphin to be taken between
October 21, 1974, and December 31, 1975.56
These regulations restricted purse-seining on dolphin to use of
certain equipment and procedures. Requirements included a one
and one-half inch stretch mesh safety panel,57 securing of hand-
hold openings, torque-balanced cable lines on vessels with histo-
ries of frequent roll-ups, use of a minimum of two auxiliary
speedboats to hold the net open to the maximum extent, a plat-
form or raft to allow physical removal of the live dolphin, and con-
tinued use of backdown and other rescue procedures until all live
dolphin were released.5 8 Although the regulations set no quota
51. Actual estimates were: 1972-304,600, 1973--175,000, and 1974-97,800. Com-
mittee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
52. 39 Fed. Reg. 32,117 (1974) (current version at 50 C.F.R. § 216.24 (1977)).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1373(d) (1976).
54. 39 Fed. Reg. 9685, 9685 (1974). Species of dolphin listed were Bottlenose,
Sarawak (Fraser's), spotted, spinner, striped, and common. Id.
55. Id. at 32,117, 32,118.
56. Committee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1146 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
57. The proposed regulations provided that two-inch mesh safety panels which
had been approved in accordance with the interim regulations met the specifica-
tions until replaced because of normal wear and tear or until July 1, 1975, which-
ever occurred first. 39 Fed. Reg. 12,356, 12,358 (1974). This provision was deleted
from the final regulations, which became effective September 30, 1974. Id. at 32,117,
32,118 (current version at 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d) (2) (iv) (1977)).
58. Id.
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for 1975, they established a goal of a fifty percent reduction in the
mortality rate.59 The 1975 regulations also required all certificate
holders6O to attend formal training sessions run by the NMFS.61
Despite these requirements, the number of dolphin deaths in 1975
was thirty-seven percent higher than in 1974.62
An amendment to the regulations that would impose a quota
was proposed in September, 1975.63 At this time the NMFS gave
population estimates for the offshore spotted dolphin and the
eastern spinner dolphin which together comprised approximately
eighty-two percent of the 1974 kill. The NMFS made no statement
as to the effect of the kills on the OSP's64 because it had not yet
determined them. 65 The NMFS rejected this proposal in Decem-
ber, 1975, stating that it would impose a quota if dolphin mortality
during the first part of 1975 did not approach the desired level.66
This approach reflected an attempt by the NMFS to balance the
interests of the dolphin against those of the tuna industry and to
rely initially on the voluntary cooperation of the industry.67 The
59. 40 Fed. Reg. 764, 765 (1975). This goal was considered obtainable assuming
full cooperation of the United States tuna fleet and a harvest similar to that of
1974. Id.
60. Once the NMFS had issued a general permit to the ATA, individual cap-
tains of ships could apply for certificates of inclusion under the general permit. 50
C.F.R. § 216.24(c) (1977).
61. 40 Fed. Reg. 764, 765 (1975). These sessions are comprised of instruction
concerning the provisions of the MMPA, the applicable regulations, the require-
ments of the certificate of inclusion and the general permit, and techniques that
are required or that will contribute to reducing serious injury and mortality of
dolphin. Id. (current version at 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d) (2) (iv) (N) (1977)).
62. 41 Fed. Reg. 30,152, 30,155 (1976). In setting the 50% reduction goal it was
assumed that fishing conditions in 1975 would be comparable to those in 1974. The
increased kill rate was attributed to different conditions such as increased dolphin
school size, different species composition of dolphin schools, and an increase in
the percent of the total yellowfin catch that was caught in association with dolphin
in 1975. Attempts to adjust the data for comparable fishing conditions resulted in
an apparent decrease of 25% in the kill rate from 1974 to 1975. Id. at 30,155-56.
63. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,531, 41,532 (1975).
64. No intelligible or generally accepted definition of OSP existed until July,
1976, when an international workshop of scientists reached agreement and NMFS
accepted their definition. Fox, Tuna/Dolphin Progran: Five Years of Progress,
OCEANS, May, 1978, at 57, 58. See note 88 infra (current definition).
65. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,531, 41,535-36 (1975).
66. Id. at 56,899, 56,899. The quota was to be imposed if, based on the mortality
rates for the first three to four months of 1976, the total projected kill exceeded
70% of the final estimated 1975 kill. Id. at 56,900. This quota would result in only a
4.1% reduction from the 1974 mortality rate in 1976. A 50% reduction in 1975 was
considered an obtainable goal. See note 59 supra.
67. The NMFS recognized a responsibility not to curtail significantly the activ-
ities of the tuna fleet. The NMFS agreed with the Marine Mammal Commission
NMFS did, however, amend the regulations to prohibit sets on
pure schools of striped dolphin.68
In response to the issuance of the regulations and the granting
of the ATA's general permit for 1975, fourteen conservation
organizations 69 filed suit against the Secretary of Commerce, the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA), and the Director of the NMFS.70 The suit was
tried in May, 1976.71 District Judge Richey rejected the assertion
that the MMPA supports any balancing of interests of the fishing
industry and the marine mammals.72 He held that the interests of
the fishing industry are to be considered only after protection of
the marine mammals has been assured.73 The regulations issued
by the NMFS were declared void because of the agency's failure
to publish adequate estimates of the existing population level of
each species affected by the proposed regulations, the OSP of
each of these species, and the expected impact of the regulations
on the effort to achieve an OSP level for each species.74 The
MMPA requires all these statements.75 The district court also de-
clared void the ATA's general permit because the ATA had failed
to prove that the takings would not work to the disadvantage of
the marine mammals concerned 76 and because the permit did not
specify the number and kind of animals authorized to be taken.77
In granting relief to the plaintiffs, Judge Richey ordered the com-
plete cessation of incidental killings and expressly rejected the
(MMC) that it lacked sufficient data to determine a level of mortality that would
allow the stock of dolphin to increase with "reasonable assurance." For this rea-
son, the MMC advocated no quota. The NMFS, however, felt that an overall quota
could be set that would reasonably assure stability for the principal stocks. 40
Fed. Reg. 56,899, 56,990 (1975).
68. Id. at 56,900, 56,903 (current version at 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d) (2) (i) (A)
(1977)).
69. Among the larger organizations were the Fund for Animals, the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, and the Committee for Humane Legislation. Minasian,
supra note 8, at 61. The number 14 is comprised of both plaintiffs and plaintiff-
intervenors. Committee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297,
299 (D.D.C.), affid and modified, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
70. Pursuant to lawful delegations by the Secretary of Commerce and the Ad-
ministrator of the NOAA, the Director of the NMFS is responsible for carrying out
the functions prescribed by the MMPA. 414 F. Supp. at 299. The court permitted
five organizations representing key elements of the United States tuna industry to
intervene as defendants. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 306-09.
73. Id. at 309.
74. Id. at 309-12.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976).
76. 414 F. Supp. at 312. Such proof is required under 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d) (3)
(1976).
77. 414 F. Supp. at 313. Specificity of permits is required under 16 U.S.C.
§ 1374(b) (2) (A) (1976).
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suggested alternative of imposing a quota.78
Judge Richey's ruling was to be effective as of May 31, 1976.79
On May 29, 1976, the NMFS requested a stay and submitted an
affidavit promising to impose a quota of 78,000 animals for the 1976
season if the stay were granted.80 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit immediately stayed
Judge Richey's order.81 Within two weeks the NMFS published
notice of the imposition of the 78,000-animal quota.8 2 The appel-
late court subsequently affumed Judge Richey's decision but
stayed the effective date of the order until January 1, 1977.83 The
court agreed with Judge Richey that the NMFS had not fulfilled
the procedural requirements of the MMPA84 but did not agree en-
tirely with his interpretation of the intentions behind the MMPA.
The appellate court was more persuaded than Judge Richey had
been by language indicating that the MMPA was never intended
to ruin the tuna industry.85 The appellate court accepted a com-
promise approach of balancing the interests of the tuna industry
against those of the marine mammals. The court emphasized that
purse-seine fishing on dolphin is not prohibited by the MMPA but
is merely subject to certain regulations.86
In October, 1976, the NMFS published its proposed regulations
for 1977. It proposed a quota of 29,920 incidental deaths comprised
of eleven specific stock quotas.87 The publication included esti-
mated population and OSP88 levels for twelve dolphin stocks; no
78. 414 F. Supp. at 314. The alternative was proposed by the Environmental
Defense Fund as an attempt at "conciliation" with the tuna industry. The sugges-
tion was rejected on the basis of the continued lack of required data and the fail-
ure of the NMFS to impose a quota despite a rise in dolphin mortality following
the expiration of the grace period. Id.
79. Id. at 315.
80. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,680 (1976).
81. Id. at 23,205.
82. Id. at 23,680.
83. Committee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1151 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 1150.
85. Id. at 1148-49.
86. Id. at 1149.
87. 41 Fed. Reg. 45,015 (1976). The official quota of 29,920 included an allowable
take of five short-finned pilot whales. These small whales are occasionally found
in association with the dolphin-tuna herds and are taken incidentally in the purse-
seines along with the dolphin. Id.
88. [OSP] is a population size which falls within a range from the population
level of a given species or stock which is the largest supportable within the
ecosystem to the population level that results in maximum net productivity.
estimates were available for coastal spotted dolphin or Costa Ri-
can spinner dolphin. Taking of these stocks was prohibited as
were takings of eastern and white-belly spinner dolphin. A pro-
posed worldwide take of each stock which would virtually assure
its population increase was published, along with the portion of
that take reserved for the domestic fleet.89 The proportion of the
allowed worldwide take reserved for the domestic fleet varied sig-
nificantly between designated stocks. The NMFS gave no justifi-
cation for the inconsistent distribution.0
Also, in October the ATA reached its quota of 78,000 for 1976;
the general permit and its certificates of inclusion were rendered
Maximum net productivity is the greatest net annual increment in population
numbers of biomass resulting from additions to the population due to repro-
duction and/or growth less losses due to natural mortality.
50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1977). For an earlier definition of OSP, see note 19 supra.
89. 41 Fed. Reg. 45,015, 45,016 (1976). Specific figures published were:
Estimated Proposed Limit Proposed
Species Stock Population on Worldwide United States
Management Units Level Take Take
spotted dolphin
(coastal) unknown 0 0
spotted dolphin
(offshore) 3,674,000 47,960 21,800
spinner dolphin
(Costa Rican) unknown 0 0
spinner dolphin
(eastern) 1,292,000 0 0
spinner dolphin
(white-belly) 549,000 3,032 0
common dolphin
(northern) 400,000 480 400
common dolphin
(central) 230,000 2,000 1,600
common dolphin
(southern) 800,000 7,100 5,600
striped dolphin
(northern) 18,000 65 40
striped dolphin
(north-equatorial) 230,000 653 400
Bottlenosed dolphin 588,000 97 60
rough-toothed dolphin 450 5 5
Fraser's dolphin 7,800 5 5
Risso's dolphin 7,500 7 5
90. For an example of this inconsistency, compare the proposals for the white-
belly spinner dolphin and for the rough-toothed dolphin, note 89 supra. The esti-
mated population of the white-belly spinner was 549,000 while that of the rough-
toothed dolphin was only 450. The proposed limits on the worldwide takes of
these stocks were 3,032 and 5 respectively. The inconsistency arises in the pro-
posed quotas for the United States fleet. Taking of white-belly spinners was to-
tally banned while the entire allowable take of five of the extremely rare stock was
claimed by the domestic fleet. Such figures do not indicate a competent attempt
by the NMFS to provide the basis for a logical stock-level international conserva-
tion scheme.
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invalid as of October 22, 1976.91 On October 21, 1976, however, a
United States district court in San Diego, California, issued a tem-
porary restraining order that precluded revocation or limitation of
the general permit until such time as the litigation was resolved.
92
The total estimated kill for 1976 was 104,000.93
By November, 1976, it was evident that even with expedited pro-
cedures, final regulations for 1977 could not be effected before
mid-February. To avoid a lapse during which fishermen might
take no marine mammals, the NMFS proposed amending the 1976
regulations to allow continued takings until the 1977 regulations
became effective.9 In early January, 1977, the NMFS extended
the ATA's general permit to cover the period from January 1 to
April 30, 1977. The allowable take, designated by species and
stock, amounted to one third of the proposed quota for 1977. The
ATA opposed these limitations as unduly restrictive.
9 5
On March 1, 1977, the NMFS promulgated final regulations for
1977. The regulations prohibited sets on any school containing
coastal spotted dolphin, Costa Rican spinner dolphin, or eastern
spinner dolphin. They also prohibited sets on any pure school of
other than offshore spotted dolphin and common dolphin.96 The
proposed approach of specific stock quotas was accepted, but the
total quota was finally set at 59,050 as a result of battling between
the tuna industry and conservation organizations.9 7 The increase
from the proposed quota of 29,920 resulted from an increase in the
quota for offshore spotted dolphin (21,800 to 43,090) and from re-
placement of the ban on the taking of white-belly spinners with a
quota of 7,840.98
91. 41 Fed. Reg. 45,569 (1976).
92. Id. at 47,254.
93. Fox, supra note 64, at 58.
94. 41 Fed. Reg. 49,859 (1976).
95. 42 Fed. Reg. 1034 (1977).
96. Id. at 12,010.
97. Id. at 12,015, 12,018. Representatives of the tuna industry testified that the
quota of 29,920, along with the ban on the taking of spinner dolphins, would be eco-
nomically disastrous to the industry. The NMFS recognized an obligation to con-
sider the economic feasibility of implementing the regulations. The industry's
record indicated that a quota of less than 80,000 would, in the short run, adversely
affect the profitability of the seiners. The NMFS refused to raise the quota above
59,050, stating that their primary consideration had to be protection of the animals.
Id. at 12,019.
98. Id. at 12,018. Not only was the ban on white-belly spinners lifted, but the
final domestic quota was more than twice the number determined to be the world-
wide biological limit necessary for the population to increase. See note 89 supra.
The 1977 regulations required the use of a one and one-fourth
inch mesh safety panel, speedboats and rescuers during
backdown and release, floodlights when sets occurred in dark-
ness, and a rubber raft and face mask to enable rescuers to deter-
mine whether any live dolphin were left in the net.99 The
fishermen encountered difficulty in acquiring and installing the
required fine mesh safety panels by the April 30, 1977, deadline,
but again the NMFS made allowances.100 The uninterrupted use
of purse-seining on dolphin continued to receive high priority.
In May, 1977, the NMFS adopted a "reasonable enforcement"
policy to govern the prohibited but accidental taking of eastern
spinner dolphins.O1 The policy specifies the time in the purse-
seine procedure when fishermen must determine whether prohib-
ited species are among the herd.102 If after that point any of the
prohibited species are identified, the set may continue, and no no-
tice of violation will be issued or penalty assessed if the prohib-
ited dolphin are subsequently encircled and killed. 0 3 The NMFS
later applied this policy to takings of rough-toothed dolphinlO4
and Fraser's dolphin10 5 when their quotas were reached. Such a
policy appears, at first, to emasculate any ban on takings of a cer-
tain species. However, the NMFS concluded that after the net is
in the water and partially encircles the school, a full deployment,
pursing, and retrieval of the net in compliance with the required
protective measures is less dangerous to the dolphin than an un-
controlled net in the water.
06
Unfortunately, no adequate means of protecting the rarest spe-
cies have yet been devised. In its proposal for the 1977 regula-
tions, the NMFS specified that the maximum biological allowable
99. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,015, 12,019 (1977). The NMFS reserved the option to pro-
hibit sets that could not be completed before darkness if such sets continued to
result in high mortality. Id. (current version at 50 C.F.R. § 216,24(d) (2) (iv)
(1977)).
100. The Southwest Regional Director of the NMFS was given authority to deal
with these cases on an individual basis. He could allow continued usage of ap-
proved two-inch stretch mesh safety panels under limited or conditional time ex-
tensions until the fine mesh panels could be installed. 42 Fed. Reg. 24,742, 24,742-43
(1977).
101. Id. at 22,575. The NMFS accepted this policy as a result of a hearing at
which participants discussed the difficulty of identifying the different dolphin spe-
cies and the degree of error involved in such identification. Both the Environmen-
tal Defense Fund and the Marine Mammal Commission agreed that an accidental
take of up to 6,500 eastern spinners would allow the population of that stock to in-
crease with virtual certainty. Id.
102. The time when the net skiff is released from the vessel attached to the net
at the start of a set is determinative. Id.
103. Id.
104. 43 Fed. Reg. 9632 (1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 42,370, 42,371 (1977).
105. 42 Fed. Reg. 58,195 (1977).
106. Id. at 64,548, 64,551.
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take that would ensure the increase of the population of rough-
toothed dolphin was five, of Fraser's dolphin five, and of Risso's
dolphin seven. 0 7 The "reasonable enforcement" policy accepts
the fact that, despite the best efforts of the fishermen, members of
prohibited species and stocks will be taken accidentally. In light
of this acknowledgement it would seem that quotas should be set
sufficiently below the maximum biological limits to compensate
for such accidental takings. In 1977, however, the NMFS allowed
the domestic fleet a quota of five of each of these three rare spe-
cies, making no allowance for accidental takings or for takings by
other States.108 Adequate protection of these rare species is of ut-
most importance. The application of the "reasonable enforce-
ment" policy should encourage the NMFS to ban the taking of
these three species altogether. Allowing the industry an initial in-
tentional take of five individuals of these species does not signifi-
cantly benefit the industry. In the conservation of these rare
species, however, the difference between an annual take of five or
ten animals may well be significant. 10 9 With little advantage for
the industry provided by a quota of five, and a distinct advantage
for the dolphin provided by a total ban, the NMFS's choice ap-
pears unsupported by any logical, economic, or policy basis.
In August, 1977, the overall quota was increased to 62,429. This
change resulted from an increase in the quota on white-belly
spinner dolphin from 7,840 to 11,219110 based on updated estimates
of existing population levels.' The increase came after the ATA
had petitioned to have the quota increased to 81,707.112 Once
again the requests of the ATA, although not entirely successful,
were effective in acquiring a modification of the regulations. The
history of the implementation of the MMVlPA and of its regulations
107. 41 Fed. Reg. 45,015, 45,016 (1976). See note 89 supra.
108. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,015, 12,017-18 (1977).
109. Loss of Fraser's dolphin in the ETP fishery may be insignificant in terms of
absolute numbers, but when one considers the rarity of the species, the numbers
are dramatic. Twenty-nine of 34 identified specimens worldwide have been taken
incidentally by tuna seiners. 41 Fed. Reg. 30,152, 30,183 (1976).
110. 42 Fed. Reg. 40,230 (1977).
111. Id. at 29,533. The updated information resulted in an increase in the esti-
mated population from 549,000 to 690,000. Id.
112. Id. The ATA, in its petition of April 15, 1977, requested that the white-belly
spinner quota be increased to 17,000 (an increase of 9,160), that the eastern spin-
ner quota be increased to 6,587 (an increase of 6,587), and that the offshore spotted
quota be increased to 50,000 (an increase of 6,910). The NMFS found the revisions
of the existing population estimates for eastern/spinners and offshore spotteds to
be insignificant. Id.
regarding the tuna industry reflects a periodic oscillation between
strict regulation and an enforcement policy characterized by
stays, postponements, and compromises. This oscillation has re-
sulted from the battle between conservationists, advocating strict
adherence to the MMPA, and the tuna industry, armed with eco-
nomic policy arguments supported by the industry's money and
influence. This battle has influenced both the courts and the
NMFS. The result has been a periodically fluctuating enforce-
ment policy that has unsuccessfully attempted to achieve an ac-
ceptable balance between the competing interests.
Despite the compromises and allowances made by the NMFS in
its enforcement policies, the industry achieved miraculous results
in 1977. The nature of the problem and the economics of the
fishery itself motivated the industry to find a solution. The moti-
vating factors include the time involved in removing dolphin from
the net when high mortality occurs and the jeopardy in which the
crew is placed. Most important, reductions in dolphin populations
will eventually terminate the use of this highly efficient fishing
method.113 Estimates of incidental mortality for 1977 showed a
substantial drop of 27,000 to 28,000-far below the final quota of
62,429. Entanglement of dolphin in nets dropped from six to
seven per set in 1976 to less than one per set in 1977. The number
of animals killed during the hauling in of the net dropped from
one per set in 1976 to less than one in ten sets in 1977. The pro-
portion of sets in which no animals were killed rose from forty
percent in 1976 to sixty percent in 1977.114 The dolphin apron was
extensively tested in 1977, and vessels using it averaged dolphin
mortality rates of about half those of other vessels.115
In December, 1977, the NMFS established final regulations for
tuna purse-seine operations in the ETP for 1978, 1979, and 1980.
These regulations set declining individual species and stock quo-
113. National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration, Dep't of Commerce, Progress of Research on Porpoise Mortality Inci-
dental to Tuna Purse-Seine Fishing for Fiscal Year 1976, at 6 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Progress of Research 19761.
114. Fox, supra note 64, at 58. The tuna fleet remained in port for nearly three
months during 1977, but the yellowfln catch was near the average amount for the
preceding four years. The low mortality was thus attributed to the mandated
equipment and procedures and to the diligent efforts of the United States
fishermen. Id. If these extremely low rates are accurate it is interesting that the
industry clamored in August, 1977, to have the quotas raised. See note 112 and ac-
companying text supra.
115. Fox, supra note 64, at 58. The apron is a trapezoidal-shaped strip of web-
bing added to the net in the vicinity of the safety panel. The apron serves to pre-
vent formation of canopies of webbing during backdown that sometimes entrap
dolphin and to reduce the depth of the pocket at the end of the backdown channel,
which will allow faster and more effective release of dolphin. Progress of Research
1975, supra note 43, at 55.
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tas, totaling 51,945, 41,610, and 31,150 respectively, for the three
years.11 6 The NMFS considered economic data on the effect of
these quotas on the profitability of purse-seiners and determined
that it would not be greatly affected."7
The mortality rate continued to drop during early 1978. In the
first three months mortality was down twenty percent from the
same period for 1977.118 The NMFS added the apron to the re-
quired equipment and vessels equipped with them in early 1978
averaged dolphin mortality rates sixty percent below those of
other vessels. All vessels were to have aprons installed by July 1,
1978.119 The use of a man with a face mask in a raft to check for
dolphin in the bottom of the net has been credited with substan-
tial reduction in post-backdown losses in 1977 and 1978. Dolphin
have been known to react to frustration by holding their breath
and sinking for a few minutes. This behavior explained the pres-
ence of dead dolphin in the nets when the entire herd appeared to
have been successfully released. The man with the face mask
now checks for these dolphin and notifies the skipper to continue
backdown until they all surface and are released.120
The dolphin are also contributing to the reduction in mortality.
They appear to be familiar with the purse-seine and backdown
procedures, resting calmly until backdown begins and then pro-
ceeding quickly to the appropriate area. Dolphin have been ob-
served hiding when pursuit begins, hanging motionless just below
the surface. The net must be set to the port side of the ship; some
herds race across to the starboard side and away to safety while
others swim under the noisy speedboats and bubbly wake rather
than turn away from them.121
Although the overall kill rate has decreased drastically, the quo-
tas continue to play an important role in the preservation of indi-
vidual species and stocks. Because its quotas were reached,
taking of rough-toothed dolphin was prohibited on March 15,
116. 42 Fed. Reg. 64,548, 64,548 (1977).
117. Id. at 64,550.
118. Fox, supra note 64, at 58. Kills per set dropped from 0.26 in 1977 to 0.15 for
early 1978. Pryor & Norris, supra note 9, at 37.
119. Fox, supra note 64, at 58.
120. Pryor & Norris, supra note 9, at 36.
121. Id. Some spotted dolphin in coastal areas off Ecuador are so skilled at es-
cape procedures that fishermen have nicknamed them the "Untouchables." Id.
For an amusing account of an encounter with this herd, see Kessler, The Hunt for
Tuna, OCEANS, July, 1976, at 50, 56-57.
1978.122 For the same reason, the NMFS prohibited taking of
northern common dolphin on June 30, 1978.123 Such prohibitions
are essential to the comprehensive dolphin conservation pro-
gram' 24 but will undoubtedly continue to frustrate fishing efforts
and to irritate the fishing industry whose overall kill rate is cur-
rently well below the allowable quota.
With direct observable mortality having been reduced to such a
low level, the NMFS has expanded its research on the effects of
the pursuit and capture process on the dolphin.125 The NMFS
considers the current quotas and mortality rates sufficiently con-
servative to ensure that any adverse effects will not prevent main-
tenance of the OSP.126
If the kill were reduced to 10,000 animals per year, and if an ad-
equate means to protect the rare species were developed, the
population dynamicist and probably the environmentalist would
be satisfied. However, to an animal protectionist, who is con-
cerned with the survival of the individuals of the species, 10,000 is
not satisfactory. To the pure protectionist there may be no ac-
ceptable number other than zero and therefore no possible solu-
tion but to discontinue the practice of setting on dolphin.127 It is
recognized and accepted that unless fishermen devise systems
that are economically more efficient than the present method of
simultaneously capturing both tuna and dolphin, incidental mor-
tality will not be eliminated. 128 The debate is certain to continue,
if not on ecological grounds, then surely on emotional ones.129
Regulations on Imported Tuna
Prior to the issuance of the 1977 regulations, the tuna industry
argued that strict compliance with the MMPA would actually ex-
acerbate the plight of the dolphin: Compliance would supposedly
drive domestic vessels and crews to foreign States that have little
122. 43 Fed. Reg. 9632 (1978).
123. Id. at 28,502. Taking of common dolphin was prohibited north of a line
drawn between 18'N, 102°30'W and 8N, 114*W. Id.
124. The enforcement of the specific stock quotas is essential to the preserva-
tion of the rare species for which very low quotas have been set. See notes 107-09
and accompanying text supra.
125. See Prepared Testimony Submitted by SWFC Staff at Hearing to Consider
Amendments to Regulations Governing Incidental Taking of Marine Mammals in
the Course of Commercial Fishing Operations, San Diego, California (Aug. 22-29,
1977) (statement of Dr. Wm. F. Perrin).
126. 42 Fed. Reg. 64,548, 64,551 (1977).
127. Pryor & Norris, supra note 9, at 37.
128. Fox, supra note 64, at 59.
129. Pryor & Norris, supra note 9, at 37.
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or no official concern for dolphin protection. 30 The final 1977 reg-
ulations did in fact stimulate the first major threat from the
domestic fleet to reregister under foreign flags.' 3' The effect on
the domestic fleet of prohibiting fishing on dolphin had not been
accurately determined. Reported estimates indicated that any-
where from thirty-three to fifty percent of the total domestic tuna
catch was acquired by fishing on dolphin. 32 The MMPA was not
intended to drive the tuna industry out of business, 33 and threats
from the tuna fleet that they would leave the country met with
matter-of-fact statements that the government would not allow
it.134 Even if domestic vessels had registered under foreign flags
they might still have been subject to Unites States law. For the
law of the flag to govern, more than registration is required. All
ties with the United States would effectively have to have been
cut. 35 In making such threats, the domestic fleet faced the reali-
zation that the MMPA provides for restricting the importation of
tuna to States that have documented their vessels' conformance
to the United States' standards. 36 Elimination of the United
States market removed any advantage of registration because vir-
tually all yellowfin caught in association with dolphin is destined
for the United States. 37
130. Committee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 312
(D.D.C.), aff'd and modified, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
131. Jackson, The Dolphin Catch- and Catch-22, SPORTS IL, May 24, 1976, at 59,
60.
132. Committee for Human Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 300
(D.D.C.), affd and modified, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
133. Committee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1148 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
134. Representative Robert L. Leggett (D.-CaL), Chairman of the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee's Subcommittee on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, stated: "We're not going to let them
leave the United States. If they try, we'll just pass a law to stop them." Prather,
The All-Porpoise War, 1977 NAT'L REV. 439, 439.
135. Committee for Humane Legis., Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 312 n.33
(D.D.C.), affld and modified, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For a detailed discus-
sion of the probability that changing to foreign flags would enable the tuna vessels
to escape the United States' jurisdiction, see Nafziger & Armstrong, The Porpoise-
Tuna Controversy; Management of Marine Resources After Committee for Humane
Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 7 ENVT'L L. 223, 266-75 (1977).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(c) (1976). A State may obtain certification by showing ei-
ther that its fishing operations are conducted in conformance with United States
regulations and standards or that such fishing does not result in an incidental
mortality and serious injury rate in excess of that resulting from domestic fishing
operations under United States regulations. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e) (5) (i) (1977).
137. Tuna Enforcement Down-Porpoise Slaughter Up, AuDUBON, Nov., 1975, at
120. Historically, the United States has been the largest importer and consumer of
As early as January, 1975, the NMFS had certified that Canada
and Denmark were fishing in compliance with United States regu-
lations regarding the taking of marine mammals.138 When the dis-
trict court invalidated the 1976 regulations, all importation of tuna
caught in association with dolphin was also banned.' 39 This order
followed the same series of stays as did the prohibition of domes-
tic purse-seining on dolphin.
When the NMFS promulgated the 1977 regulations, foreign
States were allowed a three-month grace period to effect technical
changes and to obtain certification.140 Certification is not required
for the importation of cans that are marked as containing other
than yellowfin tuna.141 No statement of past enforcement actions
by foreign States under their laws and regulations is required
for certification. 4 2 The effective date of these regulations was
initially June 1, 1977; in May, 1977, it was extended to August 1,
1977;143 in August, 1977, it was extended to October 1, 1977;144 and
in October, it was extended to December 31, 1977.145 The NMFS
justified these extensions as an attempt to avoid an unwarranted
interruption in the flow of tuna and of tuna products. It empha-
sized that all States that either had been visited or had responded
to communications had been receptive and had taken steps to
conform with United States regulations.146 Another primary con-
sideration in making the extensions was the work of the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) in formulating an
international resolution for the ETP fishery. Implementation of
that resolution would influence the decision on import exemp-
tions for many States.147 By October, 1978, Bermuda, Canada, the
Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain, Sene-
gal, and Venezuela had been granted exemptions from the em-
tuna and the second largest harvester (Japan is first). The United States accounts
for approximately 45% of the world tuna consumption and 15% of the world tuna
catch. FEIS, supra note 11, at 24-25.
138. 40 Fed. Reg. 819 (1975).
139. 41 Fed. Reg. 21,782, 21,783 (1976).
140. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,015, 12,019 (1977).
141. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e) (2) (ii) (1977).
142. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,015, 12,019 (1977).
143. Id. at 24,742, 24,742.
144. Id. at 39,394.
145. Id. at 54,294, 54,294.
146. Id. Canada, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Netherlands Antilles were in sub-
stantial conformance with United States regulations and standards. Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, and Panama had indicated an intent to comply and had undertaken
good faith efforts to achieve conformance. The remaining States, Bermuda, Peru,
Senegal, Spain, and Venezuela, had been contacted, but their position with re-
spect to conformance was still unclear. Id.
147. Id. at 54,294-95.
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bargo provisions. 148
To determine the effect of the foreign fleets on dolphin mortal-
ity, the United States sent inquiries in July, 1975, to governments
whose nationals fish for yellowfin tuna in the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans.149 Only five States responded. The Ivory Coast, Nicara-
gua, and South Korea indicated that their vessels did not set on
dolphin schools. Canada and Mexico replied that their vessels
used safety panels and backdown procedures but that no re-
search programs were underway.150
Despite the lack of direct data from foreign fleets, the NMFS es-
timated that foreign involvement in the tuna-dolphin fishery in-
creased six-fold from 1971 to 1974-from two to twelve percent of
the total catch.'5 ' By 1975, the NMFS attributed twenty-six per-
cent of the kill to foreign vessels. Although only fourteen foreign
States were involved in the ETP tuna fishery in 1975, a substantial
increase in foreign involvement was anticipated. Several States
with governmental policies of fishery expansion had obtained in-
expensive capital from international sources. 152 In 1977 vessels of
twelve of the seventeen foreign States involved in the ETP
fishery, representing eighty percent of the foreign fleet's seiner
capacity, 5 3 were fishing in association with dolphin. The foreign
fleet controlled thirty percent of the ETP fishery, and the IATTC
reported that most newly constructed foreign vessels would be
large seiners capable of fishing on dolphin.154 The NMFS esti-
mated the total incidental dolphin mortality for the foreign fleet
148. Canada, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Netherlands Antilles were exempt as of
October, 1977. Id. at 56,617. Nicaragua was exempted in December, 1977. Id. at
64,121. Bermuda and Panama were exempted in January, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 1093,
3566 (1978). Costa Rica was exempted in February, 1978. Id. at 5521. Venezuela
was exempted in July, 1978. Id. at 31,144, 31,145. New Zealand was exempted in
August, 1978. Id. at 36,263. The Congo, Senegal, and Spain were exempted in Sep-
tember, 1978. Id. at 40,025.
149. 41 Fed. Reg. 30,152, 30,160 (1976). The inquiries asked: (1) whether the
State was carrying on tuna fishing on dolphin in the Atlantic, and if so, where and
to what extent, (2) what technological research was underway or under considera-
tion to reduce or eliminate the incidental take of dolphin, (3) how the State regu-
lated the take of marine mammals incidental to the tuna fishery, and (4) whether
it would be useful to conduct future discussions on a mutual observer program.
Id.
150. Id.
151. Progress of Research 1975, supra note 43, at 64.
152. Progress of Research 1976, supra note 113, at 4.
153. See note 11 supra.
154. FEIS, supra note 11, at 25.
for 1977 as 41,000.1.5 The NMFS required States that were ex-
empted from the United States' import restrictions to provide de-
tailed data on their incidental takings.156 This data will lead to
more accurate estimates of the foreign fleet's effect on dolphin
population stocks. Regardless of the actual figures for the foreign
fleet, it is clear that the problem is international in scope and can-
not be solved by unilateral United States action.
THE INTERNATIONAL PICTURE
The United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences
Three major treaties pertinent to this discussion resulted from
the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The
first treaty, the Convention on the High Seas, guarantees freedom
of fishing on the high seas157 limited only by "reasonable regard"
for the rights of other States.15 8 However, the treaty does not
specify the rights and obligations of States utilizing living marine
resources.'5 9
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
grants to coastal States sovereign authority16O over living re-
155. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,015, 12,020 (1977).
156. Reports received were as follows: Canada-1976 estimated incidental
dolphin mortality was 115-693. 1977 mortality was not expected to exceed 1,000. Id.
at 56,617. Ecuador-no direct pursuit and encirclement of dolphin is used. Id.
Mexico-1976 estimated mortality was 7,087, not expected to increase in 1977. Id.
Netherlands Antilles-1976 estimated mortality was 217. Id. Panama-collection of
data on 1977 dolphin mortality not yet complete. 43 Fed. Reg. 1093, 1094 (1978). Ber-
muda-1977 estimated mortality was 200, not expected to increase in 1978. Id. at
3566. Costa Rica-1977 dolphin mortality from three small seiners which were not
capable of intentionally setting on dolphin was five. Estimated 1978 mortality, due
to addition of four large seiners, not expected to exceed 2,500. Id. at 5521. Vene-
zuela-estimated dolphin mortality of three seiners from May, 1978, to May, 1979,
is 150 animals. Id. at 31,144, 31,145. New Zealand---estimated dolphin mortality for
1977 was 320 animals. Id. at 36,263. Congo-estimated dolphin mortality for the
one purse-seiner operating in the ETP during 1977 was 40 animals. Id. at 40,025.
Senegal-estimated dolphin mortality for its three seiners from June, 1977, to
June, 1978, was 29 animals. Id. Spain--estimated dolphin mortality for its one
seiner during 1977 was 50 animals. Id.
157. "High seas" are defined as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state." Convention on the High Seas,
art. 1, done Apr. 29, 1958, [19621 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
158. Id. arts. 1-2. The Convention has been ratified by all major whaling States
but not by all minor ones, such as South Korea, Chile, Peru, and Norway. Scarff,
supra note 2, at 608. Of the 17 States involved in the ETP fishery in 1977, only
Costa Rica, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, the United States,
and Venezuela have ratified. TREATY AFFAiRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL At-
VISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 326 (1978).
159. Scarff, supra note 2, at 608.
160. This sovereign authority includes the right to prohibit, regulate, and mo-
nopolize the exploitation of marine resources. Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone, arL 1, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S.
No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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sources within their territorial seas. 161 This Convention does not,
however, establish the breadth of the State's territorial sea. This
issue has become one of international dispute as States have ex-
tended the traditional three-mile claim to as much as 200 miles.162
Although regulations of such international commissions as the In-
ternational Whaling Commission and the IATTC bind member
States, those States are free to adopt more stringent conservation
measures within their territorial seas. 1 63
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas distinguishes two management zones:
the high seas and areas of the high seas adjacent to the territorial
sea of a coastal State.164 The Convention specifically recognizes
the need for cooperation and coordination between coastal States
and States fishing the adjacent high seas in management of spe-
cies, such as dolphin, that migrate between territorial waters and
the high seas.1 6 5 The conservation measures of the coastal State
are binding on all signatory States whose nationals fish for migra-
tory species in the adjacent high seas. 6 6 The Convention also
provides that when several States are fishing the same stocks on
the high seas they must cooperate in reaching agreement on con-
servation measures. 67 This Convention, although not widely rati-
fied,168 provided the basis for the current Law of the Sea
negotiations concerning fishery and economic zones. 69
161. This Convention has been signed by all major but few minor whaling
States. Scarff, supra note 2, at 609. Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, the
United States, and Venezuela are the only signatory States involved in the ETP
fishery. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 158, at 327.
162. Scarff, supra note 2, at 609.
163. Id.
164. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, arts. 1-5 (high seas), arts. 6-8 (high seas adjacent to territorial sea of
coastal State), done Apr. 29, 1958, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 139, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285.
165. Id. art. 6(4).
166. Id. arts. 6-7. If other States object to the coastal State's conservation meas-
ures they may invoke a dispute-settlement procedure. Id. arts. 6-11. If negotiation
fails, the coastal State has the right to impose unilateral conservation measures in
any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea where it can be shown that
such measures are urgent, have an appropriate scientific basis, and are non-dis-
criminatory toward foreign fishermen. Id. art. 7.
167. Id. arts. 6-7.
168. Scarff, supra note 2, at 609. Of the ETP tuna fishing States, only Colombia,
France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela have
ratified the Convention. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 158, at 300.
169. Scarff, supra note 2, at 610.
Any attempts at international conservation of dolphin will be
influenced by the resolution of two issues under discussion at the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the 200-
mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the special problems re-
garding migratory species. Under the Informal Composite Negoti-
ating Text (ICNT)170 position, the coastal State is sovereign
within its EEZ171 but has a duty to ensure optimum utilization of
fisheries resources within that zone 172 while ensuring protection
against over-exploitation. 73 If unable to harvest fully the allow-
able catch, the coastal State must allow other States to harvest
the remainder.174 Marine mammals are addressed as a special
case, however, and coastal States are free to prohibit or regulate
their exploitation. A general duty is imposed on all States to co-
operate in the protection of marine mammals, but each coastal
State will determine what regulations will be applicable within its
EEZ.75 Thus, the groundwork for a pluralistic regulatory scheme
has been set, and the consequences for the dolphin are as yet un-
determined. One author has suggested that some States may
provide complete protection for cetaceans whereas a large inter-
national agency is unlikely to agree to absolute nonexploita-
tion.76 Another author has expressed the concern that coastal
States may exploit the stocks within their EEZ's with little re-
straint, effectively defeating any attempt at global conservation.177
170. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS III OR 1, and in 16
INT'L LEGAL MATERis 1108 (1977). The ICNT was adopted at the Sixth Session of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in New York
City from May 23 to July 15, 1977.
171. Id. art. 61(1).
172. Id. art. 62(1).
173. Id. art. 61(2). Over-exploitation is determined with reference to Maximum
Sustainable Yield (MSY). Id. art. 61(3). The conservation program required
under the ICNT is intended to be the result of an integration of economic, techni-
cal, social, and environmental factors. Id. art. 61(3), (4); Mirvahabi, Significant
Fishery Management Issues in the Law of the Sea Conference: Illusions and
Realities, 15 SAN DiNGo L. REv. 493, 507 (1978). Because the ICNT's guidelines are
broad and leave specific interpretation and implementation to the discretion of the
coastal State, the success of the conservation programs will depend on the reac-
tions of the various States involved. Id. at 508.
174. ICNT, art. 62(2), U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS MI
OR 1, and in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1108 (1977). Each coastal State determines
the "allowable catch" within its EEZ. Id. art. 61(1).
175. Id. art. 65. See Richardson, Introduction, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 451, 457
(1979). See also note 182 infra (describes New Zealand's recent enactment of
comprehensive marine mammal legislation).
176. Scarff supra note 2, at 613. Although Scarff is referring to the ICNT's
predecessor, the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), U.N. Doec. A/Conf.
62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/pt. 2, reprinted in 5 UNCLOS III OR 125 (1976), the provisions are
identical in pertinent part to the provisions in the ICNT.
177. Holt, International Cooperation to Protect the Whales, OCEANS, July, 1977,
at 63, 64. It is unclear whether Holt's comments are based on the ICNT or on the
RSNT; however, the provisions he discusses are identical in the two texts. For a
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Both situations will undoubtedly occur. The dolphin will best be
protected if an international organization establishes minimum
conservation standards with each coastal State retaining the right
to impose more stringent regulations within its own EEZ.
The ICNT also contains a special provision for the regulation of
highly migratory species, including all species of marine dolphin.
Coastal States whose citizens fish such species have a duty to co-
operate with other States to ensure conservation of the species
and to participate in an appropriate international conservation or-
ganization.178 The balance between the sovereignty of the coastal
State and the authority of the international organization is as yet
unsettled.179 Again, the welfare of the dolphin may be best served
if the regulations of an international organization set a minimum
standard of conservation while allowing each State to impose
more stringent standards within its EEZ.
Conservation Efforts by Individual States
Dolphin conservation measures undertaken by foreign govern-
ments are extremely limited. Of the States involved in the ETP
tuna fishery, only the United States has conducted any equipment
or behavioral research on the tuna-dolphin problem. In the devel-
full discussion of the possibilities of inconsistent application of provisions left
within the discretion of the coastal State, see Mirvahabi, Significant Fishery Man-
agement Issues in the Law of the Sea Conference: Illusions and Realities, 15 SAN
DiEGO L. REV. 493, 508-10 (1978). The United States advocates clarification of the
ICNT to indicate that each State has an obligation to impose regulations at least
as stringent as those contemplated by the ICNT. Richardson, Introduction, 16 SAN
DiEGo L REV. 451, 457 (1979).
178. ICNT, art. 64(1), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS HI
OR 1, and in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 1108 (1977.). See Richardson, Introduction,
16 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 451, 457 (1979).
179. The United States' position gives more authority to the international or-
ganization than does the proposal of Australia and New Zealand, which stresses
the rights of the coastal State. Taft, The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
ference: Major Unresolved Fisheries Issues, 14 COLurm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 112, 115
(1975). This observation is based on documents that preceded the ICNT, but the
balance between the international organization and the coastal State is still not
clearly defined, see ICNT, art. 64(1), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10, reprinted in 8
UNCLOS MII OR 1, and in 16 INT'L LEGAL MArERiALs 1108 (1977), and recognition
of the traditional opposing positions may be helpful in appreciating the tension in-
volved in the issue. Past attempts by international organizations to be active in
fishery management have failed for lack of enforcement power, adequate funding,
and capacity for scientific research. Mirvahabi, Significant Fishery Management
Issues in the Law of the Sea Conference: Illusions and Realities, 15 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. 493, 513 (1978).
oping States the limited research resources have been directed
toward other goals. In more developed States the dolphin prob-
lem has not been of great concern, perhaps because of the rela-
tively minor roles these States play in the fishery.180 The only
data contribution has come from Canada, which has placed field
technicians on its vessels to record dolphin mortality data since
1974.181
Most States involved in the ETP fishery have no legislation
dealing with the dolphin problem in the tuna fishery.182 Costa
Rica, France, Guatemala, Mexico, and the Netherlands Antilles
have laws that recognize the problem and advocate conservation
measures, but such laws are not incorporated in comprehensive
conservation schemes and are merely token policy statements. 1 3
Purse-seining is the only economically efficient means of har-
vesting tuna in most of the ETP.184 No efficient alternatives are
available, and it is highly improbable that all States involved
180. IATTC Background Paper, supra note 26, at 66.
181. Progress of Research 1975, supra note 43, at 7.
182. IATTC Background Paper, supra note 26, at 15. These States include Ber-
muda, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Japan, Nicara-
gua, Panama, Peru, Senegal, Spain, and Venezuela. Id. The government of New
Zealand has recently enacted the Marine Mammals Protection Act 1978 (on file
with the San Diego Law Review). The Act is a comprehensive piece of legislation
that attempts to protect all marine mammals within New Zealand or New Zealand
fisheries waters. Id. § 1(3) (a). The Act requires a permit for the taking of any
marine mammal including dolphin taken in the purse-seine fishery. Id. § 4. How-
ever, showing that the death or injury of a marine mammal was "accidental" con-
stitutes a defense to any action brought under the Act if the offender meets
certain reporting requirements. Id. § 24(3). This legislation is the first action
taken by any State, other than the United States, to provide comprehensive pro-
tection for marine mammals; its general scope and complexity parallel that of the
MMPA. The government of Spain has recently indicated that it is studying vari-
ous provisions similar to those of the United States for protecting marine mam-
mals. 43 Fed. Reg. 40,025 (1978).
183. IATTC Background Paper, supra note 26, at 15-16. Costa Rica-Article 9 of
an Order of January 11, 1949, prohibits fishing or hunting for any species of
dolphin and requires that they be returned to the sea alive if inadvertently caught.
France-Article 1 of an Order of October 20, 1970, prohibits the kill, pursuit, or cap-
ture, by any means, even without intent to harm any of the marine mammals
caught incidentally in the ETP tuna fishery. Guatemala-Articles 1 & 3 of an Or-
der of January 13, 1973, prohibit hunting for the bottlenose dolphin, and Article 4
requires that when caught incidentally in fishing operations they must be re-
turned to the sea immediately. Mexico-A presidential decree dated October 26,
1967, prohibits the capture of marine mammals in the Gulf of California. Letters,
dated October 21, 1976, from the Secretaria de Industria y Comercio request that
the directors of the Oficinas de Pesca in Ensenada, Cape San Lucas, and Mazatlan
inform the holders of tuna fishing licenses (1) that all dolphin caught during
purse-seining for tuna must be released immediately, (2) that estimates of the
number killed must be reported, and (3) that the presence of dolphin-saving de-
vices on each boat must be reported. Netherlands Antilles-The Nature Conserva-
tion Act, art. 24, para. 1, of the Netherlands prohibits the catching or killing of
bottlenose dolphins. Id.
184. IATTC Background Paper, supra note 26, at 38. Japan, South Korea, and
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would be willing to prohibit purse-seining on dolphin. The United
States' control of a large percentage of the yellowfin market cou-
pled with the import restrictions of the MM1PA may play a major
role in encouraging other States to implement dolphin conserva-
tion programs.
When Mexico was exempted from the import restrictions it had
expressed its intent to place fishery technicians, trained in San
Diego, California, on its seiners to collect marine mammal mortal-
ity and sighting data and to instruct the skippers and crews as to
the latest developments in dolphin rescue equipment and tech-
niques.185 When the NMFS exempted Nicaragua it knew that Nic-
aragua would participate in the IATTC international tuna-dolphin
research and observer program. Nicaragua was also considering
taking advantage of the United States' offer to assist in training
Nicaraguan observers.186 Prior to exemption, Panama187 and
Costa Rica' 88 also agreed to participate in the IATTC program
and to send two biologists apiece to San Diego, California, for the
N MFS observer training program.
The Bermudian government agreed to allow observers, Bermu-
dian or international, aboard its vessels upon request before the
vessels were exempted. The Bermudian government also ob-
tained agreements from the vessel owners that more detailed
dolphin logbooks would be kept and that observers would be al-
lowed upon the vessels.189 Venezuela informed its vessel opera-
tors that they must conduct fishing operations in accordance with
United States law and that they must follow all dolphin release
procedures required of United States operators. Although Vene-
zuela has no immediate plans for observers, agreements have
been secured from all vessel owners that all Venezuelan flag ves-
sels will be available for inspection by United States technicians
in Panama and that any deficiencies in required equipment will
be corrected. The Venezuelan government placed these require-
ments on Venezuelan vessels in conformance with its policy of
protecting the environment, flora, and fauna, which included the
Taiwan conduct some longline fishing operations, but production is slow and eco-
nomically marginal. Id.
185. 42 Fed. Reg. 56,617 (1977). This program was to be developed even prior to
the implementation of the IATTC program. Id.
186. Id. at 64,121.
187. 43 Fed. Reg. 1093 (1978).
188. Id. at 5521.
189. Id. at 3566.
recent establishment of a Ministry of the Environment and Re-
newable Natural Resources. Yellowfin exports from Venezuela to
the United States were banned from January 1, 1978, to July 20,
1978, when they were exempted from the United States' import
restrictions.190
The governments of the Congo, New Zealand, Senegal, and
Spain have informed their vessel operators that they must fish in
accordance with United States law and follow the dolphin release
procedures required of United States operators. None of these
States has any immediate plans for placing observers upon its
vessels. The NMFS exempted New Zealand from the import re-
strictions in August, 1978,191 and the Congo, Senegal, and Spain in
September, 1978.192 In addition, the government of Senegal as-
sured the United States that its vessels would be available for in-
spection by United States technicians when possible. Senegal
went further than any other State to date in volunteering to be
bound by the United States' quotas and to cease setting on any
species for which the quotas have been reached.193
Participation of International Organizations in Dolphin
Conservation
The tuna-dolphin problem is an international issue. Many
States are involved in the fishery, and both the tuna and the
dolphin migrate between the juridical zones of different States
and into and from international waters. 94 As of this writing, the
United States is the State most actively involved in control of inci-
dental dolphin mortality. The possibility of other States instigat-
ing unilateral conservation measures could result in conflicts in
the absence of a coordinating international organization.195 The
necessary means for international cooperation are relatively un-
developed.196
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations
The Advisory Committee on Marine Resource Research of the
190. Id. at 31,144, 31,145.
191. Id. at 36,263.
192. Id. at 40,025.
193. Id.
194. IAT"C Background Paper, supra note 26, at 9.
195. Id. at 71.
196. Mammals in the Seas, supra note 13, at 36. Such international coordina-
tion has to date been limited to the activities of special scientific groups within the
International Whaling Commission, the International Union for the Conservation
of Nature, and a few specialized "Associations." Id.
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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO/ACMRR) sponsored the work of the Ad Hoc Group II
(Small Cetaceans and Sirenians), which produced a comprehen-
sive report on marine mammals in 1976.197 This report catego-
rized the four species of dolphin primarily involved in the ETP
tuna fishery as in urgent need of population assessment.198 Of
these the ETP stock of spotted dolphin was considered an espe-
cially critical problem.199 Research indicated that the minimum
estimate of incidental kill of this species is tentatively at or near
the increase capacity of the present stock size.200 Greater ex-
ploitation rates of the past inevitably reduced the stock from its
original size.201 The annual kill rate for the spinner dolphin is
even higher,202 and the net production of the species is still un-
known. The population of eastern spinners is, however, assumed
to be declining.20 3
The FAO report acknowledged the technological advances ac-
quired by the United States' research and conceded that absolute
prevention of the kill by proscribing the fishing method would not
be feasible because of economic consequences and international
complexities. The solution to the problem, as seen by the FAO, is
the development of new techniques for releasing the dolphin un-
harmed from the seines.204
The FAO advocates an expanded comprehensive program of in-
ternational research on the small cetaceans and sirenians before
the problems of their conservation become large-scale battles of
conflicting public interests. The means for the necessary interna-
tional cooperation are admittedly non-existent and in need of
study.20s The FAO's program is to be concentrated on the species
and on the kinds of research that need most immediate attention.
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
197. Id.
198. Id. at 5. Species so categorized included the spinner, striped, spotted, and
common dolphin. Id.
199. Id. at 6.
200. Id. at 11. The annual incidental exploitation rate (catch/stock) was esti-
mated as 1.6 to 4.2%. The natural rate of increase has been calculated as between
-2.5 to 6.6% per annum, with a most likely value between 1.6 and 4.0%. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 13. The annual incidental exploitation rate for spinners was esti-
mated to be between 2.4 and 8.1%. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 26.
205. Id. at 35-36.
Whale Group, the Small Cetacean Subcommittee of the Scientific
Committee of the International Whaling Commission, and Group
I of ACMRR agree that among the projects most urgently needed
are detailed studies of the spinner, spotted, striped, and common
dolphin.206
The FAO program is purportedly designed to cure the gaps and
deficiencies in existing research programs. The FAO report notes
several deficiencies in the current United States research pro-
gram and the need for international integration of the develop-
ment of technological research tools. Problems of reliability of
the catch data exist for several reasons: (1) the catch is not
landed, (2) essentially only the United States' fishery is sampled,
(3) only the Commission Yellowfin Regulatory Area (CYRA)207 is
sampled, and (4) it is assumed that dolphin mortality on vessels
with observers is representative of that on vessels without observ-
ers. Other problems exist with the reliability of data obtained
from the fishery, which is used as a basis for evaluating the entire
population regarding such factors as age and sex composition.208
After making these evaluations of the problem, the current re-
search, and the objectives, the FAO proposed two international
workshops: one on age-determination methods 209 and one on fe-
male cetacean reproductive data.2 10 These workshops may act as
inroads in international scientific cooperation on how to study the
dolphin, but they fall far short of an attempt at international coop-
eration to protect and conserve them.
The International Whaling Commission
Many of the whaling States signed the International Whaling
Convention 2 11 in 1946. The International Whaling Commission
(IWC) was established when the Convention came into effect on
December 10, 1948.212 The function of the IWC is the management
of whale populations for the protection of both the whale species
and the whaling interests.21 3 A scientific Committee composed of
206. Id. at 60.
207. See note 222 infra.
208. Mammals in the Seas, supra note 13, at 61.
209. Id. at 74.
210. Id. at 77.
211. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with Schedule of
Whaling Regulations, done Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S.
72.
212. As of January, 1978, members include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Panama, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States.
Panama gave notice of withdrawal on November 16, 1977, effective June 30, 1978.
TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 158, at 382.
213. Clark, Whales: Timefor a Fresh Start, 65 NEW SCIENTIST 206, 207 (1975).
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recognized world authorities on assessment of whale populations
from the member States advises the IWC.214 Based on this advice
the IWC publishes a schedule which specifies protected species,
whaling seasons, closed waters and sanctuary areas, size limita-
tions, methods of whaling, quotas, permitted equipment, and
other information and requirements necessary for effective whale
management.215
The IWC has consistently rejected the imposition of an absolute
moratorium on commercial whaling.216 The United States and
Great Britain have repeatedly advocated such a moratorium,
while the Soviet Union and Japan have repeatedly opposed it.217
The IWC rejected a blanket moratorium as inconsistent with its
policy of management of the species and stock levels. However,
the IWC did call for an International Decade of Cetacean Re-
search in 1972.218
While the IWC's primary concern has been with protection of
the large cetaceans, its emphasis has recently been shifting to the
smaller cetaceans. In April, 1974, the Subcommittee on Small
Cetaceans of the IWC's Scientific Committee reviewed the biol-
ogy, geographical subdivisions, and fisheries status of each spe-
cies of the smaller cetaceans. 219 The Subcommittee produced a
detailed scientific report that provided the first comprehensive
analysis of international data on the smaller cetaceans.220
At the 1976 meeting of the IWC, the Small Cetaceans Subcom-
mittee urged that the IWC assume management of all cetaceans
taken deliberately for their own value.221 Such a step would ex-
tend the IWC's involvement into many dolphin and porpoise
fisheries. The IWC also adopted a resolution requiring member
214. Is the Whale Doomed?, AusT. FISHERIES, June, 1975, at 12, 13.
215. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with Schedule of
Whaling Regulations, art. 5, done Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161
U.N.T.S. 72.
216. The IWC first rejected the recommendation of the delegates of the Confer-
ence on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, who proprosed a 10-year
moratorium on all commercial whaling in 1972. No Whaling Moratorium, but
Quota System Set, 102 Sci. NEWS 23, 23 (1972). The moratorium, advocated again
by the United States at the IWC's 1975 meeting, was again rejected. 41 Fed. Reg.
30,152, 30,153 (1976).
217. No Whaling Moratorium, but Quota System Set, 102 Sci. NEWS 23, 23
(1972).
218. Is the Whale Doomed?, Ausm_. FISHERIES, June, 1975, at 12, 14.
219. Martin, Foreword, 32 J. FIS ERIES RESEARCH BOARD CAN. 879 (1975).
220. Smaller Cetaceans, note 3 supra.
221. Scarff, The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises:
An Interdisciplinary Assessment (pt. 1), 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 323, 374 & n.289 (1977).
695
nations to report incidental kills of cetaceans in tuna purse-seine
and other operations. 222 The IWC may become a reliable and
comprehensive source of mortality data, but there are no indica-
tions that the IWC will assume a more active management role in
future dolphin conservation.
The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
Current multilateral conservation measures consist primarily of
agreements concerning specific populations designated by geo-
graphical and biological distribution.223 In regard to the ETP tuna
fishery, it has been suggested that one international organization
should manage both the tuna harvest and the dolphin problem.
The goals of maximizing the tuna harvest and of minimizing
dolphin mortality are potentially conflicting. If both goals are to
be attained, each must be pursued with conscious consideration
of the other. A balance is more likely to be maintained if one
body coordinates the attack on both problems.
224
The IAT'TC manages the ETP yellowfin fishery under a quota
system. 225 This international conservation program has been nec-
essary since 1966 because of heavy exploitation of yellowfin.22 6
The IATTC's tuna-conservation regulations tend to increase fish-
ing in areas where dolphin-associated tuna predominate in the
latter half of the year. In this way the IATTC has acted as an im-
pediment to the reduction of incidental dolphin mortality.22 7 As
222. Progress of Research 1976, supra note 113, at 7.
223. Schaefer, Some Recent Developments Concerning Fishing and the Conser-
vation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371, 379
(1970).
224. IATTC Background Paper, supra note 26, at 9.
225. FEIS, supra note 11, at 23. The IATTC operates under the authority and
direction of a convention originally entered into by Costa Rica and the United
States. Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, done May 31, 1949, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3.
The Convention, which came into force in 1950, is open to adherence by other gov-
ernments whose nationals fish for tropical tunas in the ETP. Under this provision
Panama adhered in 1953, Ecuador in 1961, Mexico in 1964, Canada in 1968, Japan in
1970, and France and Nicaragua in 1973. In 1967 Ecuador gave notice of its inten-
tion to withdraw from the Commission, which became effective in 1968. Annual
Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission for 1977, at 7 (1978) (on
file with the San Diego Law Review). Mexico gave notice of its intention to with-
draw on November 8, 1977, effective November 8, 1978. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra
note 158, at 300.
226. Annual Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission for 1977,
at 16 (1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review). The conservation program
applies within the Commission Yellowfin Regulatory Area (CYRA), which is de-
fined as the area bounded on the east by the North and South Americas and on
the west by 125' longitude between 40*N and 20°N latitude, 120'W longitude be-
tween 20'N and 5°N latitude, 110°W longitude between 50'N and 10'S latitude, and
by 90°W longitude between 10'S and 30°S latitude. Id. at 118.
227. Progress of Research 1976, supra note 113, at 5.
[VOL 16: 665, 1979] Comment
SAN DIEGO LAIW REVIEW
of 1975 the IATTC's only contribution to the resolution of the
dolphin problem was an additional 1,000-ton allocation of the
IATTC quota to the United States for the purpose of equipment
research in the Commission Yellowfin Regulatory Area (CYRA)
during 1975. The IATTC renewed this research allocation for 1976.
Discussions favorable to the possibility of a mutual observer pro-
gram began. The IATTC passed a resolution that supported joint
agreements between the Commission and any State desiring to
conduct research on the tuna-dolphin problem. 228 The IATTC
called upon its Director of Investigations to prepare a report on
the necessary research; that report was submitted at the October,
1976, meeting.2
29
At its 1976 annual meeting, the IATTC called for a comprehen-
sive technical review of existing information pertaining to the
tuna-dolphin problem and for the preparation of a detailed pro-
posal for IATTC dolphin research.23 0 At that time the Commis-
sion agreed upon three objectives: to strive to maintain a high
level of tuna production, to maintain dolphin stocks at or above
levels that assure their survival in perpetuity, and to make every
reasonable effort to avoid needless or careless killing of
dolphin.31 Although the second objective could be fulfilled at
population levels less than those that result in maximum net pro-
ductivity, the goal of the NMFS under the MMPA, the third objec-
tive may result in larger population sizes than the second
objective demands. 232 It cannot yet be determined whether the
objectives and policies of the IATTC will conflict with those of the
United States on this issue.
The report prepared for the 1977 meeting indicated that the
IATTC should be the international organization to take full re-
sponsibility for dolphin management in the ETP tuna fishery.2 33
228. 41 Fed. Reg. 30,152, 30,159 (1976).
229. IATrC Background Paper, supra note 26, at 21. The title of that report is
The Tuna-Porpoise Relationship and the IATTC. Id..
230. 42 Fed. Reg. 38,982, 38,990 (1977).
231. IATTC Background Paper, supra note 26, at 4-5. The Commission chose
these objectives instead of the extreme positions that it would do nothing, believ-
ing that there was no problem or that if there was it would be resolved by the in-
dustry itself, by actions of individual States, or by another organization; or that it
would attempt to protect all dolphin in the ETP from the possibility of death
caused by the fishery either by imposing an immediate ban on all purse-seining on
dolphin or by phasing out the procedure. Id. at 24.
232. Id. at 8.
233. Id. at 9.
The report also emphasized the economic health of the fishery. It
stated that changes in fishing technology not only must protect
the dolphin but must reward the fishermen as well. The develop-
ments in United States equipment research have fulfilled both
criteria.23
4
The report further delineated four focal elements for any seri-
ous effort to reduce dolphin mortality: (1) It should be interna-
tional in scope, (2) all vessels should be equipped with the best
dolphin-saving equipment currently available, (3) the fishermen,
especially the skippers, should be well-trained in dolphin-saving
techniques and highly motivated to use them, and (4) some sys-
tem should exist to ensure that the proper equipment is fished in
the correct manner.235 In conclusion, the report advocated the
use of observers aboard non-United States vessels to allow addi-
tional biological data to be gathered 236 and to eliminate the uncer-
tainty in estimating kill rates for non-United States vessels.2
37
In June, 1977, the IAITC reviewed this proposal. It unani-
mously passed a resolution to fund an international dolphin re-
search and observer program that would include workshops and
seminars to evaluate and disseminate dolphin-saving techniques
and equipment technology. This program will provide new data
on the mortality rates of the non-United States fleet and could re-
sult in the reduction of those rates such that the aggregate mor-
tality would not increase in direct proportion to the increased
fishing efforts.238 This resolution further provided for the inclu-
sion of non-member States operating in the ETP fishery. Imple-
mentation of this resolution by IATTC member States played a
significant role in their subsequent exemption from United States
import restrictions. 239
If the IATTC proves to be an efficient management vehicle for
the implementation of dolphin-protection programs in the ETP
fishery, the Commission involved in management of the Atlantic
234. Id. at 39.
235. Id. at 50.
236. Id. at 78. The use of observers would result in data from vessels that fish
on dolphin-associated tuna inside the CYRA during the latter half of the year.
United States vessels do not fish at this time and place. Id.
237. Id. Kill rates for non-United States vessels have previously been assumed
to be the same as for United States vessels. Id.
238. FEIS, supra note 11, at 48-49.
239. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,294, 54,294-95 (1977). For the full text of the resolution, see
Annual Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission for 1977, at 8-9
(1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review). All members of the IATTC were
represented at the meeting except for France, which later cabled approval of the
resolution. Observers from Bermuda, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Italy, and
Peru were also present. Id.
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tuna fishery could assume similar responsibility.240 Because the
practice of purse-seining on dolphin in the Atlantic is as yet less
developed and widespread than in the Pacific, an opportunity ex-
ists for conservation measures to precede an urgent situation cre-
ated by the expanding practice of purse-seining on dolphin.241
The Responsibility of the United States in International
Programs
Whatever action is taken by other States and international or-
ganizations, the responsibility of the United States in formulation
and enforcement of a global protection program is undeniable.
The MMPA imposes an obligation on the Department of State to
initiate negotiations for the development of bilateral and multilat-
eral agreements with other States for the protection and conser-
vation of all marine mammals covered by the Act.242 This
obligation is specifically emphasized with respect to States that
engage in fishing operations that are unduly hazardous to marine
mammals. 24 3 In the past such actions have been limited to sug-
gestions and proposals indicative of a passive United States atti-
tude toward global conservation. The possibility of the United
States becoming more actively influential in such negotiations by
using the MMPA's import-restriction provision, as well as its ef-
fect on the success of the IATTC's programs, has been discussed
above.
In addition to the moratorium on imported yellowfin under the
MMPA, the United States could ban the importation of all tuna-
fish products from any State whose nationals fish in a manner
that diminishes the effectiveness of an international fishery con-
servation program under the Pelly amendment. 244 The amend-
ment's broad definition of international fishery agreements
240. See International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, done
May 14, 1966, [19691 20 U.S.T. 2887, TIA.S. No. 6767, 673 U.N.T.S. 63. Current signa-
tories include Brazil, Canada, France, Gabon, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Japan,
South Korea, Morocco, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, the United States,
and the Soviet Union. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 158, at 301.
241. See note 13 supra.
242. 16 U.S.C. § 1278(a) (1) (1976).
243. Id. § 1378(a) (2).
244. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1976). The Pelly amendment is part of the Fishermen's
Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1979 (1976). It is intended to enhance the
effectiveness of international fishery conservation programs.
includes international programs for cetacean conservation. 245
Thus, the United States may ban not only all yellowfin imports
but all other fish-product imports as well from any State that frus-
trates the purpose of an international program to protect the
dolphin and to reduce their incidental kill in the tuna industry.
The invocation of these trade sanctions does not demand that a
species or stock be in danger of extinction or that a treaty be vio-
lated. The "offending" party need not even be a party to the con-
servation program it is hindering. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has used the Pelly amend-
ment to encourage non-IWC States to join the IWC or at least to
comply with IWC regulations. 246 It could actively be used in con-
nection with the IATTC's attempts to internationalize dolphin
protection if the United States decides to accept fully the respon-
sibilities imposed by the MMPA.
A RADIcAL GOAL OF DOLPHIN PROTECTION
Given increasingly efficient dolphin-protection technology and a
well-coordinated international program, an ecological solution to
the problem of dolphin conservation may conceivably be found.
However, the emotional issue of protecting the individuals of the
species may never be resolved.24 7 With regard to cetaceans gen-
erally, and dolphin specifically, the concept of individual protec-
tion is spreading rapidly. Recognition is increasing that these
creatures are different from other animals and that the extent of
that difference is as yet undetermined.
Throughout history ocean-going peoples have recognized
dolphin in their poetry and folklore. With the development of civ-
ilization, however, Man has distinguished himself from other ani-
mals on both religious and scientific grounds. Few people
question the difference between individual human rights and the
types of rights that man bestows on animals. The idea of a
dolphin being represented in court claiming the right to freedom
from slavery is not generally accepted. Few people, if any, would
place the incidental mortality of dolphin in the tuna industry on
the same plane with a situation in which several thousand
humans died each year because of their involvement in an effi-
cient technique of hunting, fishing, or harvesting.
245. "International fishery conservation program" means any ban, restriction,
regulation, or other measure in force pursuant to a multilateral agreement to
which the United States is a signatory party, the purpose of which is to conserve
or protect the living resources of the sea. Id. § 1978(g) (3).
246. Scarft supra note 2, at 604.
247. Pryor & Norris, supra note 9, at 37.
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A few people, however, believe strongly in the individual rights
of cetaceans. They are speaking out more and more frequently.
John C. Lilly, M.D.,248 has studied both the biological2 49 and the
behavioral250 evidence that dolphins are intelligent, ethical, and
social creatures deserving rights as individuals under our laws.
Lilly proposed guidelines for such new laws in 1976, including:
(1) Cetaceans are no longer to be considered as property, nor as an in-
dustrial resource, nor as stocks of animals.
(2) Cetaceans are to have complete freedom of the waters of the earth.
(3) Individual dolphins and whales are to be given the legal rights of
human individuals. Human individuals and groups are to be given the
right to sue in behalf of, or otherwise represent in court, cetacean individ-
uals placed in jeopardy by other humans.
25 1
Social and judicial acceptance of these ideas has already begun
to be tested. In May, 1977, the individual rights of two Atlantic
bottlenose dolphin were asserted by two men who released them
from the University of Hawaii Institute of Marine Biology. In Jan-
uary, 1978, the first of these two men, Ken LeVasseur, came to
trial on the charge of grand theft. The trial posed the moral and
philosophical issue of whether humans have the right to hold in-
248. John C. Lilly, M.D., is a trustee of the Human/Dolphin Foundation and is
doing research with minicomputers on communication with dolphin. He is the au-
thor of LILLY ON DOLPHNs: HUMANS OF THE SEA (1975); MAN AND DOLPHIN (1961);
and THE MIND OF THE DOLPHIn (1967). Lilly, The Rights of Cetaceans Under Human
Laws, OCEANS, Mar., 1976, at 67, 68.
249. Among the biological evidence are the facts that: Man's brain differs from
that of apes, his nearest cousins in the size of cerebral cortical "silent" areas in
the frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes. These "silent" areas are devoted to cen-
tral processing, e.g., thinking, imagination, long-term goals, and ethics. Man uses
these cortical areas for understanding, justice, compassion, and the need for social
interdependence. Recent neurological studies by several scientists show that in
cetaceans whose brains are larger than Man's, the additional mass is in the "si-
lent" areas. Recent microscopic analysis of cetacean brains has revealed that their
cellular densities and connections are as large and complex as Man's. Brain size
is not directly related to body size, and the "silent" areas of the brain are not in-
volved in body movement at all. Lilly, The Rights of Cetaceans Under Human
Laws, OCEANS, Mar., 1976, at 67, 67-68.
250. Behavioral studies indicate that the lives of cetaceans are regulated by a
cetacean education and a cetacean ethic. Man is treated as a special case in this
system and is not to be injured even under extreme degrees of provocation.
Dolphin show an awareness of the needs of their group; the group cares for a sick
or grieving dolphin, but if the care interferes with group survival the individual
voluntarily stops breathing and thus commits suicide. Dolphin also appear to be
very interested in communicating with humans and will reprogram their outputs
to solve communication tasks imposed by humans; that is, they will produce
sounds in the air audible to humans although their normal mode of communica-
tion is by way of underwater vibrations inaudible to humans. Id. at 68.
251. Id.
telligent creatures like dolphins in captivity.252 This moral issue
translated to the legal issue of whether dolphins can be consid-
ered intellectually inferior experimental property at all. 25 3 Green-
peace, a Canadian group devoted to saving whales, issued a
declaration of dolphin rights during the trial. The declaration in-
cluded this: "In the spirit that moved lawmakers to enfranchise
first men with property, then men free and white, and finally wo-
men, we plead with today's lawmakers to treat generously that in-
telligence of the sea .....-254 Judge Masato Doi instructed the
jury, however, to treat the dolphin as simple property. Le Vas-
seur was found guilty.
255
The trial of the second man, Steve Sipman, was to begin April
10, 1978.256 However, on his own motion, Judge Masato Doi post-
poned the prosecution of Sipman indefinitely until the appeal
filed on behalf of Le Vasseur is decided. This action bolstered the
enthusiasm of Sipman, Le Vasseur, and their attorneys, who are
confident that they will win the appeal. 25 7 Both men and their at-
torneys believe that the law needs to be changed.25 8
The battles of the conservationists regarding the tuna-fishery
problem and of the protectionists advocating individual dolphin
rights appear to be separate and distinct. The resolution and
even the debate of the individual rights issue must, however, af-
fect the action taken regarding the tuna fishery. Research and
regulations currently emphasize the safe release of dolphin but
continue to allow intentional pursuit and capture. As the rights of
cetaceans, or at least public concern for their well-being, are ex-
panded, this procedure may become intolerable. The mandate for
the United States to initiate international dolphin-protection pro-
grams will also take on a moral emphasis as respect for the
dolphin species increases.
The efforts of conservationists and protectionists could effec-
tively be consolidated in pursuit of the goals of both groups.
These goals are not in opposition but merely reflect the difference
252. 199 ScI. 37 (1978).
253. Chapple, supra note 5, at 33.
254. 199 SCL 37 (1978).
255. Hawaii v. Le Vasseur, Cr. No. 50322 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 1978), appeal
filed, No. 6930 (Haw. Sup. Ct. Feb. 16, 1978). Le Vasseur was sentenced to six
months in jail with five years probation but was released on his own recognizance
pending appeal. Chapple, supra note 5, at 33.
256. Chapple, supra note 5, at 33.
257. Telephone interview with John Schweigert, attorney for Ken Le Vasseur
(Jan. 26, 1979).
258. Chapple, supra note 5, at 33.
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in the degree of protection with which each group will be satis-
fied. The protectionists cannot consistently advocate dolphin in-
dividual rights and fail to pursue actively a solution to the tuna-
fishery problem that causes the deaths of thousands of dolphin
annually. Because the goals of the protectionists are extreme and
are not generally accepted, the cause could benefit from the statu-
tory support of the MIVIPA. Protectionists could emphasize the
MMPA definition of "taking," which includes harassment,259 and
which the regulations have expanded to include any acts, whether
negligent or intentional, that disturb or molest a marine mam-
mal.2 60 The low kill rates reported for the domestic fleet for 1977
have already diluted public concern regarding the tuna-fishery
problem. The conservationists, if they are to succeed in their
objectives, must remember the international problem and keep
the issue alive by demanding pressure by the United States for
effective international regulations. Conservationists may effec-
tively use the publicity and the public emotion generated by the
individual rights issue to support their demands for insignificant
kill rates for effective international programs.
CONCLUSION
The IVIMPA has not achieved its goal of reducing incidental
dolphin kills by the domestic fleet to an insignificant number ap-
proaching zero. Kills have, however, been drastically reduced in
1977 and 1978. Despite the residual domestic problem, this sub-
stantial reduction has shifted the emphasis of the problem to a
search for an international solution.
The IA'ITC has accepted responsibility for management of the
problem in the ETP yellowfin fishery, but it has not indicated any
intent to impose regulations to limit directly the dolphin kill. Al-
though the use of the MPA's import restrictions has enabled the
United States to acquire agreements from many States to fish in
accordance with the United States' regulations, the practical ef-
fect of these agreements remains unknown. As with all interna-
tional agreements, the problem of information acquisition inhibits
efficient regulation.
The potential role of the United States in formulating an inter-
national conservation program is significant because of the eco-
259. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1976). See note 26 s'upra.
260. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1977).
nomic enforcement mechanisms available through restriction of
imports under the MMPA and the Pelly amendment. To date the
United States has assumed a conservative role in the interna-
tional problem and has not implemented the activist involvement
policy adopted in the MMPA. Although the problem is increas-
ingly international, the United States has the responsibility of in-
stigating action in the absence of an active international
organization. The mechanisms and policy basis for such activism
are present; all that is required now is the United States' motiva-
tion to pursue an emotional, environmental cause in the face of
international economics and politics.
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